Animal ethics-the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals-is 2 experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science 3 remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal 4 ethics rest. Here we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and 5 animal ethics, before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with 6 it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists 7 to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the 8 evidence they generate. 9 Keywords 10 animal behavior, behavioral biology, animal ethics, animal welfare 11 3
7 between these so-called "two cultures" persists even in the context of obviously shared ethical 136 concerns (Fraser, 1999) . While the integration of normative and empirical approaches to animal 137 welfare and conservation sciences have eventually gained advocates (i.e., welfare: Dawkins, (Dawkins, 2006) . 142 The gap between ethicists and behavioral scientists has further been maintained by 143 mutual defiance and skepticism. If and how animals should be used in science has been a core 144 question of animal ethics since its inception, and behavioral research has immediately been the 145 focus of severe criticism for conducting painful and unnecessary experiments (Ryder, 1975; 146 Singer, 1975). Ethicists subsequently became suspicious towards, or dismissive of, any scientific 147 procedure involving animals to study their behavior (Fraser, 1999) . Meanwhile, animal behavior interferences with the study subject (Kennedy, 1992) . Such detachment in the name of 155 objectivity may have contributed to the notion that an ethical sensibility towards subjects of 156 research is "unscientific" and "subjective," and may still prevent many researchers from 8 animal lives must exceed any harmful costs (Singer, 1975) . In contrast, theories of animal rights 167 are based in deontological ethics, pursuant to which duties to animals come from the respect that 168 they deserve as agents with their own unique interests, aims, and goals. Theorists in this school 169 consider animals' lives to be intrinsically valuable and propose to grant them basic rights-such 170 as the right to life, freedom, and not to be tortured-to prevent them from being treated as "mere 171 means" such that their interests are sacrificed to human interests (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; 172 Francione, 1995; Regan, 1983 ). This generates a critical tension with welfare approaches, 173 according to which animals retain an instrumental value in situations in which benefits (to the 174 human community) might outweigh harm (to the animals). It is clear that when animal scientists 175 do engage with ethical debates, the prevailing utilitarian, welfare-based approach is often 176 adopted by default, probably due-at least in part-to the use of animals in scientific research. Should animal behavior scientists concern themselves with animal ethics? 187 A greater integration between animal ethics and the animal behavior scientific community is 188 desirable for ethical and pragmatic reasons. Foremost, there is an ethical reason in that scientists 189 fulfill a social responsibility when they engage with and help others understand ethical 190 implications of research. Yet there are also pragmatic benefits for science, including helping 191 scientists examine sources of historical and cultural bias that may limit scientific questions and 192 approaches, and so further enrich and broaden scientific understanding. Some of these benefits explanatory frameworks in the behavioral sciences can quickly overlook or render invisible the 256 very "object" of moral concern-the organism itself as a potentially sentient entity that can be 257 benefited or harmed-or, at the very least, relegate the organism to secondary status (Walsh, 258 2015). 259 
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The language that animal behavior scientists habitually employ reflects this deeply 260 entrenched practice (Crist, 1999) . Reducing animal behavior to mechanistic, causal descriptions 261 has reinforced the view of animals as "mere" objects or "vehicles" of their genes and 262 environment, preempting any inferences to their mental life or agency (it is noteworthy that in 263 the writings of early naturalists such as Darwin, animals were commonly portrayed as 264 individuals with an array of meaningful subjective experiences and aims). For example, scientists 265 have traditionally used terms such as "innate releasing mechanism" while habitually relegating 266 complex behavioral phenomena-usually those linked with cognitive or affective capacities-to 267 more "parsimonious" explanations, further distancing themselves from the animals they study.
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However, this presupposes that such technical, parsimonious descriptions are also unbiased, and 269 it would behoove scientists to realize that the theoretical language they employ is built on an that are closely related to us, a revelatory context regarding such a bias, referred to as 287 "anthropodenial" by de Waal (1999). According to basic evolutionary principles, the most 288 parsimonious explanation in such cases is the one assuming that similar processes in closely 289 related species emerge from common ancestry ("phylogenetic parsimony"). A scenario in which 290 12 the evolution of distinct cognitive processes generates similar behavioral manifestations in 291 closely related species is, in fact, improbable. It is also revealing to note that simple mechanistic 292 explanations are generally favored over phylogenetic parsimony when discussing cognitive 293 capacities, as opposed to physiological or anatomical traits, for which scientists have no problem 294 invoking human-animal similarity (de Waal, 1999) . This bias appears to be a direct, pervasive 295 legacy of the famous Morgan's Canon proposed at the end of the 19th century, which states that: 
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Another upshot of this approach is that the threshold of evidence needed to provide 304 support for a particular cognitive or emotional faculty in other species is much higher than in our once thought to lack self-awareness due to their failure to pass the mirror self-recognition task, 346 which is strongly biased towards visual species, but they were subsequently found to succeed in 347 passing an "olfactory mirror" test (e.g., Gatti, 2016). The role of perspective-taking in animal themselves, as intrinsically valuable and as objects of ethical concern-particularly concerning 384 planetary health criteria grounded in the capacity to sustain and generate biodiversity. Just as in 385 the case of animal behavior science and animal ethics, ecology too has been a source for 386 combating anthropocentrism and generating a more balanced, indeed scientifically informed, 387 worldview regarding the place of humans as one species embedded within deeply 388 interconnected, interdependent living systems (Callicott, 1990) . defiance-that would more demonstrably provide evidence for autonomy to the court system. Concluding remarks 510 Animal behavioral scientists have much to gain from their academic community's engagement 511 with animal ethics. By jumping into the discussion, scientists also engage more directly with a 512 revolution that has been in part stimulated by their work. Given the rapid rise and foreseeable 513 progress of debates around animal ethics, it is certain that the current generation of animal 514 behavior scientists will have to confront the questions that it raises in the coming decade(s), both 515 as scientists and as citizens. Developing a stronger, more informed and engaged stance that aims 516 to build consensus surrounding questions raised in animal ethics becomes critical to ensure the 517 long-term importance and contribution of their scientific field, to fulfill their moral obligations, 518 and to meet societal expectations by taking part in debates that they are well-positioned to 519 inform. We hope that this paper will encourage this pressing and overdue discussion. We would like to extend our thanks to many colleagues for insightful comments at various stages 523 of this manuscript's preparation, especially: Alice Baniel, Alecia Carter, Marie Charpentier, 524 Becca Franks, Jennifer Jacquet, Alex Lee, and Harry Marshall. We are further grateful to several 525 anonymous reviewers, who provided thorough and constructive feedback, as well as Marc
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Bekoff for his advice and encouragement. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the 527 non-human animals with whom we have worked over the years. Those experiences inspired this 528 paper and most importantly, cultivated a personal and professional concern for animal ethics. 
